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CASE SUMMARIES 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
MACFARLANE v. WALTER 
179 F.3D 1131 (9TH eIR. 1999) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Macfarlane v. Walter/ the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that Washington state and 
county early-release credit systems for prisoners violate the 
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.2 
The early-release credit systems unconstitutionally provide 
fewer early-release credits to pre-trial detainees who cannot 
afford to post bail than to similarly-situated prisoners who 
post bail and serve their entire sentences after trial in state 
prison.3 The court held that awarding fewer good behavior 
credits for time served in county jail than for time served in 
state prison denies equal protection of the law to pre-trial de-
1 Macfarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999). The appeal from the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Washington was argued and submit-
ted on October 5, 1998 before Circuit Judges Otto R. Skopil, Stephen Reinhardt, and 
Susan P. Graber. The decision was filed May 5, 1999 and amended June 9, 1999. 
Judge Reinhardt authored the opinion. 
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. ("[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). 
3 See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1142 (1999). 
167 
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tainees who serve part of their sentences in county jail due to 
lack of funds to post bail, because the court found no relation-
ship between the state's purpose of maintaining prisoner disci-
pline and offering fewer good behavior credits.4 However, in 
the case of good performance credits, the court held that ex-
cluding pre-trial detainees from earning good performance 
credits for participation in work or treatment programs does 
not deny equal protection of the law because there is a rela-
tionship between the state's purpose of preventing flight from 
prosecution and excluding pre-trial detainees from participat-
ing in off-site work or treatment programs.5 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Petitioner-appellant Donald Macfarlane was sentenced to 
concurrent terms6 of six years for possession of a controlled 
substance and eight months for assault in the third degree.7 
Petitioner-appellant James Fogle was sentenced to five years 
for possession of a controlled substance.a Both were detained 
in county jails before their trials and sentencing.9 Macfarlane 
4 See id. Good behavior credits are automatically awarded to prisoners who have no 
incidents of misbehavior during a specified number of days. See id. at 1135 n.l 
5 See id. at 1143. Good performance credits can be earned only by participating in 
work, education, or treatment programs. See id. at 1135 n.l 
6 Concurrent terms are two or more prison sentences assessed against the same 
person but running simultaneously so that the time served is credited to each sen-
tence. A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (Bryan A. Garner ed., Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Inc. 1987). 
7 See In re Fogle, 904 P.2d 722,728 n.l (1995). 
a See id. 
9 It was not clearly established in the Washington Court of Appeals or Washington 
Supreme Court why Macfarlane and Fogle did not post bail. The Washington Su-
preme Court noted that "both defendants were held on separate fugitive warrants," 
which may have rendered them ineligible for bail. See id. at 726. However, on a peti-
tion for discretionary review, the Washington Supreme Court was compelled to con-
strue the facts in the light most favorable to petitioners and, therefore, accepted their 
contention that they were detained pre-trial solely for lack of funds to post bail. See 
id. It was more favorable to petitioners' position for the court to accept indigence as 
the basis for their pre-trial detention because the disparate treatment of pre-trail 
detainees based on poverty warranted intermediate scrutiny rather than mere ra-
tional basis review. See In re Mota, 788 P.2d 538, 543 (1990). Respondent county jails 
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spent 144 days in Clark County Jail, and Fogle spent 102 days 
in Pierce County Jai1. 10 Because the county jails offered fewer 
early-release credit than state prisons, Macfarlane and Fogle 
earned fewer early-release credit in county jail than they 
would have earned if they had posted bail and served their en-
tire sentences post-trial in state prison.11 
Based on the discrepancy in early-release credit, Macfar-
lane and Fogle filed personal restraint petitions with the 
Washington Court of Appeals.12 The petitioners alleged that 
they were being held in prison illegally, in violation of the 
equal protection clause. 13 
A criminal sentence must be credited one day for each day 
the defendant actually served before trial. 14 Further, the 
Washington statute allows a criminal sentence to be reduced 
by credits earned for good behavior and for good performance.15 
Early-release credits for good behavior and good performance 
are calculated differently by the state prisons, operated by the 
did not challenge the Washington Supreme Court's assumption that petitioners were 
detained pre-trial solely due to lack of funds to post bail and thus could not challenge 
the assumption on appeal. See Macfarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131,1136 n.5 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
10 
See Fogle, 904 P.2d at 725. 
11 
See Macfarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999). 
12 
See id. at 1137. The Latin phrase habeas corpus, means: "you should have the 
body," a personal restraint petition requests the court to determine whether the peti-
tioner's imprisonment is illegal. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed., West 
Publ'g Co. 1996). 
13 
See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1137. 
14 
See Fogle, 904 P.2d at 725 (citing In re Williams, 853 P.2d 444 (1993». 
~ . 
See Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, Wash. Rev. Code 9.94A.150(1) 
("The eS-med early release time shall be for good behavior and good performance, as 
determined by the correctional agency having jurisdiction."). Good behavior credits 
are automatically awarded to prisoners who have no incidents of misbehavior during a 
specified number of days. Prisoners receive the maximum good behavior credits un-
less they lose credits for misbehavior. In contrast to the automatic good behavior 
credits, prisoners earn good performance credits only for proactive participation in 
work, education, or treatment programs. See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1135 n.1. 
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Washington Department of Corrections (DOC), than they are 
by the county jails, operated by local county governments. 16 
The DOC awards state prisoners one day of good behavior 
credit for every three days served, with a possible reduction of 
up to one quarter of the sentence. 17 The DOC also awards 
state prisoners up to one day of good performance credit for 
every six days served if they participate in work, education, or 
treatment programs. 18 Good behavior and good performance 
credits are then combined to allow total early release credits 
up to the statutory maximum of one third of the sentence.19 
In contrast to the twenty-five percent good behavior credits 
available to state prisoners, the Clark and Pierce County jails 
only offered good behavior credits up to fifteen percent of the 
sentence.20 Moreover, pre-trial detainees in Clark and Pierce 
County jails were completely ineligible for good performance 
credits.21 The discrepancy resulted in state prisoners earning 
early-release credit at nearly twice the rate of county pre-trial 
d t . 22 e alnees. 
Macfarlane and Fogle both earned maximum good behavior 
credit while in county jail, one day of credit for every 5 2/3 days 
16 The Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 provides that "earned early re-
lease time shall be for good behavior and good performance. as determined by the 
correctional agency having jurisdiction." Wash. Rev. Code 9.94A.150(1) (emphasis 
added). See Macfarlane at 1135. 
17 
See Macfarlane. 179 F.3d at 1135. 
18 See id. 
19 See Wash. Rev. Code 9.94A.150(1). 
20 See Macfarlane. 179 F.3d at 1135-1136. A 15% reduction translates into fifteen 
days of good behavior credit for every eighty-five days served. or a ratio of one day 
earned for every 5 213 days served compared with the state prison good behavior ratio 
of one day earned for every three days served. The Ninth Circuit decision noted that 
Pierce County has since brought its good behavior policy into conformity with ~e DOC 
so that inmates are now eligible for good behavior credits of up to 113 of their sentence. 
See id. at 1135 n.2. 
21 See id. at 1136. Pre-trial detainees in Clark and Pierce County jails were not al-
lowed to participate in work programs and were thus prevented from earning any good 
performance credits. 
22 
See id. 
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of good behavior.23 If Macfarlane and Fogle had served their 
entire sentences post-trial in state prison, they would have 
earned one day of credit for every three days of good behavior. 24 
Thus, if Macfarlane had been able to post bail and serve his 
entire sentence post-trial in state prison, he would have been 
released from custody twenty-seven days sooner.25 Fogle would 
have been released from custody seventeen days sooner had he 
served his entire sentence post-trial in state prison.26 
Macfarlane and Fogle filed personal restraint petitions with 
the Washington Court of Appeals alleging that the early-
release credit policies governing pre-trial detainees denied 
them equal protection of the law.27 The Court of Appeals 
granted Fogle's petition.28 However, the court denied Fogle's 
23 
See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1136. Macfarlane served 144 pre-sentence days with 
good behavior at the rate of one day of credit for every 5 213 days of good behavior. 
Thus, the county jail should have awarded Macfarlane 25 days of early-release credit. 
Macfarlane was awarded only 21 days of early-release credit. Although Macfarlane 
did not challenge the county jail's calculation of 21 days, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
21 days was a miscalculation. Macfarlane should have received 25 days of early-
release credit for 144 days of good behavior. See id. at 1136 n.7. Fogle served 102 pre-
sentence days with good behavior at the rate of one day of credit for every 5 213 days of 
good behavior. Thus, the county jail should have awarded Fogle 18 days of early-
release credit. Fogle was first awarded only 15 days of early-release credit. After 
Fogle challenged the county jail's original award, the Washington Court of Appeals 
awarded him 17 days, but this calculation was also incorrect. The Ninth Circuit noted 
that Fogle should have received 18 days of early-release credit for 102 days of good 
behavior. See id. at 1136 n.6. 24 
See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1135. 25 
See id. Macfarlane would have earned 48 days of credit for 144 days of good be-
havior in state prison, instead of the 21 days' credit he received from county jail, a 
difference of 27 days. 
26 See id. Fogle would have earned 34 days of credit for 102 days of good beh,vior 
in state prison, exactly twice as much early-release credit as the 17 days he earned in 
county jail. 27 
See id. at 1137. Macfarlane and Fogle claimed that the state denied them equal 
protection of the law by denying them the opportunity to earn early-release credits of 
up to 113 of their sentences on par with their counterparts in state prison. 28 See Fogle, 904 P.2d at 725. Fogle's petition was granted because of Pierce 
County jail's erroneous calculation of 15 days' early-release credit for 102 days of good 
behavior. Even the Court of Appeals miscalculated the credit, awarding Fogle only 17 
days' credit, still one day short of the 18 he was due. See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1136 
n.6. 
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equal protection claim because county jails have statutory 
authority to develop and implement early-release policies.29 
Fogle petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for discre-
t · . 30 lonary reVIew. 
The Washington Supreme Court granted Fogle's petition 
and certified Macfarlane's petition, which had not yet been de-
cided by the court of appeals.3t The court subjected Macfar-
lane's and Fogle's equal protection claims to intermediate scru-
tiny, which it reluctantly conceded was merited by the wealth-
based classification.32 The Washington Supreme Court found 
no equal protection violation.33 
29 See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1137. Purs~ant to The Washington Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1981, "procedures ... shall be developed and promulgated by the correc-
tional agency having jurisdiction in which the offender is confined." Wash. Rev. Code 
9.94A.150(1). 
30 
See id. 
3t 
See id. 
32 •• See In re Mota, 788 P.2d 538, 543 (1990) (cltmg State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212 
(1983». Intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review based on the 
Washington Supreme Court's prior decisions that people who are deprived of a liberty 
interest due to indigency comprise a semi-suspect class. A semi-suspect class is a 
group that is sometimes subjected to invidious discrimination based on unfounded 
stereotypes, thus deserving more than mere rational basis review, but is at other 
times subjected to disparate treatment based on actual characteristics that the state 
may legitimately recognize, thus deserving less than full-blown strict scrutiny. Inter-
mediate scrutiny requires that any disparate treatment of members of a semi-suspect 
class must be substantially-related to an important government objective. See gener-
ally Craig v. Boren, 427 U.S. 190 (1976). The Washington Supreme Court determined 
that in some cases the poor are a semi-suspect class: "The poor, while not a suspect 
class, are not fully accountable for their status." See In re Mota at 543 (citing State v. 
Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983». "Situations involving discrete classes not accountable 
for their status invoke intermediate scrutiny." See id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982». 
33 
See id. The Washington Supreme Court held that the disparate treatment of 
pre-trial detainees was justified by the state's important interest in "maintaining 
prisoner discipline, particularly by preventing flight from prosecution and preserving 
local control over jails." The Court also found no due process violation, because the 
county jails established and followed written early-release policies consistent with due 
process requirements. See id. at 727. Nor were petitioners put at risk of double jeop-
ardy, because their claims of multiple punishment could not be supported just by 
speculation that more early-release credits might have been earned under a different 
system. See id. (citing State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983». 
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Upon denial of their state personal restraint petitions, 
Macfarlane and Fogle filed habeas corpus petitions in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington in August 1996.34 Their petitions were again con-
solidated.35 The respondent county jails moved for summary 
judgment.36 The district court granted summary judgment, 
holding that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate stan-
dard under federallaw.37 Macfarlane and Fogle appealed the 
summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.3s 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
Pursuant to the Federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Ninth Circuit could not 
grant Macfarlane's and Fogle's petitions for Federal habeas 
corpus relief unless the Washington Supreme Court's decision 
on their state personal restraint petitions was contrary to, or 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law 
as determined by the United States Supreme. Court.39 The 
Ninth Circuit found the Supreme Court decision in Bearden v. 
34 
See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1137. A petition for habeas corpus, a Latin phrase 
meaning "you should have the body," is brought by a prisoner and requests an audi-
ence before the court for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner's impris-
onment is illegal. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed., West Publ'g Co. 
1996). 35 See id. 36 See id. 37 
See id. at 1137-1138. Because the Washington Supreme Court applied interme-
diate scrutiny, the U.S. district court assumed the decision was consistent with clearly 
established federal law in Bearden v. Georgia, which also applied intermediate scru-
tiny. See Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
3S 
See id. at 1138. 
39 See Macfarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 1999). The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act amended 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d)(1) to 
provide: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 
claim that was alljudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudi-
cation of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States." See 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d)(1). 
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Georgia40 to be clearly established Federal law. Although the 
defendant in Bearden was incarcerated for defaulting on a fine, 
rather than for failing to post bail, the Ninth Circuit in 
Macfarlane reasoned that both situations involve indigent 
criminal defendants subjected to incarceration where wealthier 
criminal defendants would not be.41 Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the balancing test in Bearden governs whether incar-
ceration imposed solely for lack of financial resources violates 
equal protection ofthe law.42 
In accordance with Bearden, a court must weigh four fac-
tors when faced with an equal protection claim alleging dispa-
rate treatment by the criminal justice system due to indigency: 
first, the nature of the individual interest affected; second, the 
extent to which the individual interest is affected; third, the 
rationality of the connection between legislative means and 
purpose; and fourth, the existence of alternative means for ef-
fectuating the purpose.43 Here, because Macfarlane and Fogle 
were subjected to longer periods of incarceration, the individ-
ual interest affected is liberty.44 Because physical liberty is a 
fundamental interest protected by the United States Constitu-
40 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662·663 (1983). The defendant in Bearden was 
sentenced to probation, payment of a fine, and restitution after pleading guilty to 
burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He defaulted in payment of the fine 
and restitution because he was indigent. The court found he had no income or assets 
during the period when payments were due, and he was unable to find work despite 
bona fide efforts. The defendant's probation was revoked for failure to pay the fine 
and restitution, and he was sentenced to serve the duration of his probation in prison. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals found no equal protection violation in imprisoning 
Bearden for failure to pay the fine, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied review. 
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662·663. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that imprisonment of a probationer solely for financial inability to pay a fine is uncon· 
stitutional unless no alternate means exist to meet the state's interest in crime pun· 
ishment and deterrence. See id. 461 U.S. at 672. 41 
See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1139. 42 
See id. at 1140. 
43 
See id. at 1139 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983». See also 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
44 
See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1141. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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tion, depriving someone of liberty to any extent in violation of 
the Constitution is intolerable.45 
The State of Washington asserted that county jails need 
different good behavior credit systems than state prisons to 
maintain prisoner discipline and preserve local control of 
county jails.46 However, the Ninth Circuit found no rational 
connection between the discrepancy in good behavior credits 
and maintaining prisoner discipline.47 Further, prisoner disci-
pline is already maintained by alternative means.48 The Ninth 
Circuit also found no rational connection between the discrep-
ancy in good behavior credits and preserving local control of 
county jails.49 Instead of certifying the number of early-release 
credits a pre-trial detainee earned in county jail, local authori-
ties could certify the total number of days spent in county jail 
and the number of days of good behavior. 50 Once the prisoner 
is transferred to state prison, the DOC could award early-
release credits for the number of days of good behavior in 
county jail. 51 The Ninth Circuit thus ordered the Washington 
Department of Corrections to calculate the number of good be-
havior credits Macfarlane and Fogle would have received un-
45 See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1141. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XN. 
46 
See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1141-1142. 
47 See id. at 1142. The Ninth Circuit noted that the goal of maintaining prisoner 
discipline through good behavior would rationally be advanced by offering more good 
behavior credits, or at least by offering equal good behavior credits to all inmates. The 
goal of maintaining prisoner discipline was not advanced by offering less good behavior 
credits to pre-trial detainees. See id. 
48 See id. Good behavior credits already achieve prisoner discipline, not because of 
the way the credits are calculated, but because credits are awarded to prisoners who 
demonstrate good behavior and are denied to prisoners who misbehave. See id. 
49 ' See id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, since pre-trial detainees will be trans-
ferred to state prison if convicted, the amount of good behavior credits inmates ulti-
mately receive after transfer to state prison has no affect on local control of county 
jails. County jails determine what constitutes good behavior and whether a pre-trial 
detainee in their custody has earned it, but they have no rational interest in the total 
number of good behavior credits an inmate receives after being transferred to state 
prison. See id. 
50 
See id. 
51 See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1142. The credits would be calculated using the 
DOC early-release credit system that applies to state prisoners. See id. 
9
Benesis: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
176 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1 
der the state prison system and to reduce their sentences by 
that amount. 52 
The State of Washington also asserted that county jails 
need different good performance credit systems than state 
prisons to protect community safety, preclude risk of flight, 
and, again, to preserve local control of county jails.53 The 
Ninth Circuit found a strong rational connection between the 
State's concerns and the good performance policies excluding 
pre-trial detainees from participation in off-site programs. 54 
Further, the Ninth Circuit found no practicable alternative 
means to protect community safety and preclude risk of flight 
while allowing pre-trial detainees to participate in off-site pro-
grams. 55 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that denial of good 
performance credits to pre-trial detainees in county jail does 
not violate the equal protection clause. 56 Macfarlane and Fogle 
thus did not receive adjustments to their sentences for good 
performance credits they might have earned in county jail.57 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit decision seems just in light of its choice 
of Bearden as controlling law. However, other circuits that 
have decided similar equal protection claims have not found 
52 . See Id. at 1143. 
53 . See Id. 
54 
See id. The Ninth Circuit recognized that excluding pre-trial detainees from 
work, education, or treatment programs away from jail is rationally related to com-
munity safety because pre-trial detainees comprise a more dangerous prison popula-
tion than post-trial county jail inmates who were sentenced for relatively minor 
crimes. Not al\owing pre-trial detainees to participate in off-site programs is also 
rationally related to mitigating risk of flight, as pre-trial detainees may be more likely 
to risk an escape than post-trial county jail inmates serving relatively short sentences. 
Finally, unlike the counties' good behavior policies, the good performance policies are 
rationally related to preserving local control because good performance credits are 
earned by participating in work, education, or treatment programs which are funded 
and administered locally. 
55 . See td. 
56 
See Macfarlane. 179 F.3d at 1143. 
57 . See td. 
10
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Bearden to control. 58 The First and Tenth Circuits found 
McGinnis v. Royster59 to control the issue of whether denying 
good behavior credits to pre-trial detainees violates equal pro-
tection.60 Based on the rational basis test used in McGinnis, 
both the First and Tenth circuits held that denying good be-
58 See Lemieux v. Kerby, 931 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1991). In Lemieux, a state pris-
oner's Federal habeas corpus petition claimed that New Mexico's· sentencing scheme 
violated equal protection by denying good behavior credits to pre-trial detainees too 
poor to post bail. See id. at 1392. The alleged equal protection violation was similar 
to that alleged in Macfarlane, except that New Mexico completely denied both good 
behavior and good performance credits to pre-trial detainees, whereas Washington 
offered less good behavior credits and completely denied only good performance credits 
to pre-trial detainees. See id. The Tenth Circuit held that New Mexico's asserted 
purpose of offering good behavior and good performance credits in order to rehabilitate 
criminals was rationally related to denying credits to pre-trial detainees because reha-
bilitation is not warranted until after a person has been convicted. See id. at 1393. 
The court based its decision on McGinnis v. Royster, where the United States Supreme 
Court held that an equal protection claim brought by pre-trial detainees who were 
denied good behavior credits for their presentence incarceration was subject only to 
rational basis scrutiny and that the state's interest in rehabilitating criminals was 
rationally related to reserving good behavior credits as a tool of post-sentence rehabili-
tation. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 2701273 (1973). In Lemieux, the Tenth 
Circuit specifically rejected the petitioner's assertion that McGinnis was overruled by 
Bearden. See Lemieux at 1393 n.4. See also Chestnut v. Magnusson, 942 F.2d 820 (1st 
Cir. 1991). In Chestnut, the First Circuit applied McGinnis to an equal protection 
claim brought by an indigent pre-trial detainee and held that Maine's denial of good 
behavior credits to pre-trial detainees did not violate equal protection. See id. at 824. 
The court specifically stated that indigency does not create a class calling for strict 
scrutiny. See id. Although Lemieux and Chestnut were both decided well after 
Bearden, it is significant that neither decision found Bearden to be applicable. 
~ . 
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). 
60 
See McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 270-273. In McGinnis, the United States Supreme 
Court decided an equal protection claim brought by pre-trial detainees who were de-
nied good behavior credits for pre-sentence time served in county jail. Based on New 
York's asserted purpose of awarding good behavior credits as part of its criminal reha-
bilitation program, the Court held it was rational to deny credits to pre-trial detainees 
because no systematic rehabilitation programs exist in county jails, and detainees 
merely awaiting trial should not be subject to rehabilitation. See id. Notably, the 
McGinnis decision seems not to be based on indigency. Although the prisoners in 
McGinnnis were unable to post bail, and they alleged they were treated differently 
than "those fortunate enough to obtain bail prior to sentence," the Court framed the 
issue in terms of whether denying good behavior credits for time served before trial 
"violates the equal protection of the laws and discriminates against those state prison-
ers unable to afford or otherwise qualify for bail prior to trial." See McGinnis, 410 
U.S. at 268. (emphasis added). Without basing its decision on indigency, there was no 
reason for the Court to apply any test other than rational basis scrutiny. McGinnis 
also was not a Federal habeas corpus petition, so no statement of clearly established 
law was required. See McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 265 n.2. 
11
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havior credits to indigent pre-trial detainees does not violate 
equal protection.61 
Among the Federal Courts of Appeals, the Ninth Circuit 
stands alone in citing Bearden to hold that an early.;release 
credit system offering less good behavior credits to indigent 
pre-trial detainees violates equal protection of the law.62 The· 
Ninth Circuit's divergence from other circuits leads one to be-
lieve that there is no controlling law. 
The threshold question in a federal habeas corpus proceed-
ing brought by a state prisoner is whether the prior decision in 
the state court habeas proceeding was contrary to "clearly es-
tablished federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States."s3 Inconsistency among the federal circuits 
61 See McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 270. The Court did not recognize a suspect class and 
held that the "determination of an optimal time for parole eligibility ... require[s] only 
some rational basis to sustain [it]." 
62 
The Ninth Circuit cites Bearden as controlling law on the issue of whether 
awarding less early-release credits to pre-trial detainees in county jail than to other 
state prisoners violates equal protection of the law. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 
660 (1983). Other circuits cite McGinnis v. Royster as controlling law on the same 
issue. In Bearden, the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny to an equal pro-
tection claim based on indigency and held that revoking probation solely for financial 
inability to pay a fine violates equal protection of the law. Like Macfarlane, the deci-
sion in Bearden was based on indigency, but Bearden was not about awarding less 
early-release credits to pre-trial detainees. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672. McGinnis, 
however, was an equal protection claim brought by pre-trial detainees who were de-
nied good behavior credits for pre-sentence time served in county jail. See McGinnis, 
410 U.S. at 264-265. Although the facts were similar to those in Macfarlane, the Su-
preme Court in McGinnis did not base its decision on indigency. See McGinnis, 410 
U.S. at 268. Finding no suspect class, the Court applied the rational basis test and 
held that denying good behavior credits to pre-trial detainees who had not yet been 
convicted of a crime was rationally related to the state's purpose of awarding good 
behavior credits only as part of its criminal rehabilitation program. See McGinnis, 410 
U.S. at 268-273. The choice between Bearden or McGinnis as controlling law thus 
appears to depend on whether the issue is framed as denial of early-release credits to 
indigents who cannot afford to post bail, or denial of early-release credits to pre-trial 
detainees, whether their inability to post bail is due to indigency or to some other 
reason. 
63 See 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d)(1). ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on be-
half of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
12
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as to which Supreme Court case is clearly established law un-
dermines any threshold determination that the state court de-
cision was contrary to clearly established law. It would not be 
unreasonable for a state to argue that there is no clearly es-
tablished federal law, and therefore, the federal habeas corpus 
petition should fail. The Supreme Court should swiftly inter-
vene due to the inconsistent decisions within the circuits. Un-
til the Supreme Court intervenes to decide which circuit is cor-
rect, it remains to be seen whether Bearden or McGinnis, or 
neither, is clearly established federal law on the issue of 
whether there is an equal protection violation when less early-
release credits are awarded to pre-trial detainees who spend 
time in county jail because they cannot afford to post bail. 
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